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Abstract:
What happens to revolutionary movements when they assume power?  While the
literature in political science and sociology has traditionally argued that new parties
will reflect societal cleavages within nation states, recent analyses have challenged the
assumption that new political parties will reproduce the patterns of earlier
parliamentary democracies and observed the increasing influence of international and
transnational actors.  In this paper, I argue that new political parties may emerge
around political rather than economic cleavages in conditions of rapid change, while
assistance to political parties may create a dual relationship whereby international
organizational forms and issue areas lacking historical precedent are adopted, but
adapted to mobilize public support.  To demonstrate this claim, I contrast assistance by
U.S. political party affiliates to parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where
similar revolutionary movements emerged during the fall of communism but diverged,
with a rightist party in the Czech Republic and populist semi-democratic party in
Slovakia winning subsequent elections (and agreeing between them to divide
Czechoslovakia).  The divergent paths taken by the two countries highlight the limits
to applying Western models of party organization across contexts and the need for
democratic actors to be strengthened beyond founding elections.
5I.  Introduction1
What happens to revolutionary movements when they assume power?  While
the literature in political science and sociology has traditionally argued that new parties
will reflect societal cleavages within nation states, recent analyses have challenged the
assumption that new political parties will reproduce the patterns of earlier
parliamentary democracies and observed the increasing influence of international and
transnational actors.  In this paper, I argue that new political parties may emerge
around political rather than economic cleavages in conditions of rapid change, while
assistance to political parties may create a dual relationship whereby international
organizational forms and issue areas lacking historical precedent are adopted, but
adapted to mobilize public support.  It is, I emphasize, beyond the scope of this paper
to test the impact of international factors upon democratization in general.  As
Schmitter notes, “the international sphere is almost by definition omnipresent since
very few polities in the contemporary world are isolated from its effects; however its
causal effects are often indirect, working through national agents” (1996:501).  Rather,
I compare assistance by U.S. political party affiliates to new parties in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, where similar revolutionary movements emerged during the fall
of communism but diverged, with a rightist party in the Czech Republic and a populist
semi-democratic party in Slovakia winning elections in 1992.
Before turning to the scholarly literature, I discuss the emergence of new
political parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia (the two republics of
                                         
1 The research for this paper was conducted as part of the project, “Evaluating NGO strategies for
promoting democracy and preventing ethnic conflict in formerly communist states,”directed at
Columbia University and funded by the Carnegie Corporation.  I have benefited from the constructive
comments of many, including Ron Aminzade, Michael Dauderstadt, Jack Goldstone, Petr Lom, Doug
McAdam, Sarah Mendelson, Philippe Schmitter, William Sewell, Jr., Jack Snyder, Sidney Tarrow,
Charles Tilly, and Jan Zielonka.  Any errors are of course my own.  Revisions were conducted while a
Jean Monnet fellow at the European University Institute.
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Czechoslovakia until the division of the country in 1992) to highlight the puzzles
involved.
II.  The puzzle
The fall of communism in Czechoslovakia in late 1989 was especially dramatic
because of the hard-line taken by the communist regime until its demise.  Repression
and relative economic security prevented the emergence of democratic challengers
until the regime became isolated internationally and provoked mass protest by its
violent repression of a student demonstration in November, 1989.  More generally,
Pridham and Lewis argue that in 1989 “democratic political parties in eastern Europe
existed in a rather embryonic form or were totally absent” (1994:12).  Rather than
representing parties with defined constituencies, the revolutionary civic movements in
Czechoslovakia proclaimed that they represented “society” against the state.  Quickly,
however, this revolutionary unity came under strain with internal disagreements about
the appropriate path of developments.  The form which the successors to these
movements take was unclear.  In the immediate post-communist environment, political
parties were associated in most people’s minds with communism, and the civic
movements maintained their identities as broad coalitions in the first free and fair
elections in 1990 (in which they secured popular support for a two year m ndate for
economic and political liberalization).  As the Czech prime minister argued in 1990:
the dominant feature of public political opinion is distrust and even unwillingness to
participate in political parties.  This is true even among people who are politically
active.  This is the reflection of an instinctive distaste for political parties in general,
and for everything that is associated with party apparatuses, discipline, leaders’
privileges, perks and so on.  These are vague, over-generalized dislikes, and spring
from the experience of Communist rule. (inWhipple, 1991: 173)
7While Civic Forum in the Czech Republic won a majority of the vote in the first free
plurality of the vote (see table 1 for complete election results).
The subsequent emergence of new political parties in Czechoslovakia would
the economic transformation or the question of the c stitution which specified the
Havel declared in the summer of
1991 that political parties in Czechoslovakia were not 
link to the people they claimed to represent:
Loyalty to the party leadership and even the party apparatus becomes more
abilities of politicians.  Party structures can create something of a shadow state
within the real state.  Electoral optimism and 
more important than the actual interest of society....It could hence easily
by them at all. (Wheaton and 
The number of parties and party-identification of deputies changed at a dizzying speed
between 1990 and 1992.  For example, in the 1990 elections, eight parties and
civic movements had created more than twenty parties and factions and a core of
independent deputies who abandoned their initial party identification without acquiring
period.  In 1994 there was only one party in the Czech National Council that had the
same delegation it started with after the 1992 electionsL ff b erves, in the
beginning “the voter had no guarantee that the party supported in one election would
have retained the same partisan affiliation between elections” (1997:103-4).  Two
months before the June, 1992 elections, nearly one-third of the Czech electorate
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declared itself undecided about which, if any, political party to support (Wolchik,
1995:227).
In this dynamic period, transnational party organizations from established
democracies sought to assist movements to establish democratic political parties and
institutions.  The National Democratic Institute (NDI) reports that it sought to provide
immediate assistance in Czechoslovakia:
In a December 1989 survey mission to then-Czechoslovakia, an NDI delegation
met with recently-elected President Vaclav Havel who said to the group, 'We
need advice, here, now, immediately.  Not from government but from
professionals who know election laws.  If you can bring somebody to Prague
by Monday, that would be wonderful.'  With NED funding, NDI was able to
respond quickly to President Havel's request.  The following week, NDI sent a
four-person international team of election law experts to consult with the
Czechs and Slovaks who were writing the rules for the first free election in 44
years. (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 1996)
Assistance to new or emerging democratic political parties is often conceived as a
fundamental part of international democracy assistance since political parties are
understood to be important and necessary components of stable democracies that
provide the mechanism by which diverse voices and interests are articulated and claims
are made within the polity.  For example, the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED) identifies its mandate as:
promoting U.S. non-governmental participation in democratic institution
building abroad...[including] strengthening democratic electoral processes in
cooperation with indigenous democratic forces, fostering cooperation with
those abroad dedicated to the cultural values, institutions and organizations of
democratic pluralism; and encouraging the establishment and growth of
democratic development in a manner consistent both with the broad concerns
of U.S. national interests and with specific requirements of democratic groups
in other countries." (NED, 1997)
Two of its satellite organizations, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the
International Republican Institute (IRI), define their mandate in terms of meeting the
NED objectives described above.  NDI’s 1996 Mission Statement declares its emphasis
to be on “democratic development that focuses on the roles and functions of political
parties and other institutions fundamental to democracy” (NDI, 1996). More
specifically, NDI identifies three areas of political party assistance targeted towards
the institutional structures of a political party that make it an effective organization that
can consolidate citizen interests; (2
researching, campaigning and monitoring of elections;  and (3)  governance or assisting
in orienting new members, educating constituencies, building coalitions and seeking
IRI’s 1995 Mission Statement declares that its “grassroots
political programs are designed to share techniques and experiences of democratic
country” (IRI, 1995).
The break-up of the civic movements into nascent political parties took place in
parties which had broken away from the dissident base of the original revolutionary
movements.  The Civic Democratic Party led by Finance Minister Klaus in the Czech
Meciar each won
approximately 33 percent of the vote for the Federal Parliament (see table 2 for
popular support for the separation of the country, the leaders of the two strongest
parties declared their inability to work together and proceeded to divide the country
country in Eastern Europe in which a rightist party had emerged to govern successfully
while a populist semi-democratic party governed in Slovakia.
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The classic explanation for the transformation of movements into parties is
Robert Michel’s (1962) organizational argument that mass movements are inevitably
channeled into formal organizations which favor an oligarchic elite rather than the
masses.  Because “democracy is inconceivable without organization,” the initial
democratic aspirations that give rise to movements, he argued, will inevitably be
subverted by a political class possessing organizational skills that enable them to
impose their will upon the party (Michels, 1962:61).  Similarly, the literature on
political parties and revolutions predicts that revolutionary movements will break-up as
a common process of political struggle whereby an initial “honeymoon” period of
artificial unity is succeeded by the forging of a “dominant coalition” to address the
concerns that initiated state breakdown (Goldstone, 1991:422).  The logic of these
explanations includes cynical interpretations of J c bin ruthlessness at eliminating
enemies, as well as pragmatic ones which argue that different skills are needed to rule a
government (such as the securing of revenues and resources, including popular
support, money, technical expertise).  Because parties must maintain at least periodic
social support, the literature in political science and sociology argues that new parties
will represent social cleavages within nation-states (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).  Some
have sought to apply this approach to postcommunist Eastern Europe, distinguishing
parties by their presumed social bases (Kitschelt, 1992) or a combination of social
bases, issue dimensions and the stability of party competition (Evans and Whitefield,
1993).
The focus on societal cleavages within nation-states has come under two main
forms of criticism:  (1) it assumes new political parties will reproduce the same path as
parties in earlier parliamentary democracies and (2) it ignores the increasing influence
of international actors upon postcommunist polities.  First, it is problematic to assume
that all new parties will follow the same path of development as earlier parties in
11
parliamentary democracies -- a so-called “natural history” approach that has been
Goldstone, 1991).  For example, 
has argued that a simple application of Western parliamentary models to the new
parties in Eastern Europe “ignores the very substantial changes that have taken place in
anachronistically presumes that parties in today’s neodemocracies
through all the stages and perform all the functions of their predecessors” (1992:426).
Pridham and Lewis observed that in 
articulated links between new parties, on the one hand, and social groups, on the other
are generally lacking and processes of representation are subject to considerable
Challenging the view that "there are interests out there -- real, particular,
independent, societal interests, waiting for the chance to politically articulate their
Ost argued that the historical
political parties can be based. (1991:4)  In these conditions, scholars have emphasized
Ekiert,
1991,1992, Jadwiga Staniszkis argued that the Solidarity
interests which would benefit from its economic program.  She cited the declaration by
Syryjczyk, candidate for Minister of Industry, about the middle class in 
1989:  "I represent subjects that do not yet exist." (1991:184)
Second, the criticism of the natural history approach highlights its inability to
rhetoric and elections have become largely irrelevant in explaining how a party will
govern in Western democracies, that “much of a party’s record in office will be
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stamped upon it by forces outside its control.” (1984:142)  Rather, he argues, parties
are increasingly bound by global politics: “Britain’s membership in the European
Community is the most obvious symbol of constraint upon a British government’s
powers of decision.” (Rose, 1984:151)  Mathews goes further to argue that the
Westphalian system of nation-states is over, that national governments are “not simply
losing autonomy in a globalizing economy.  They are sharing powers -- including
political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty -- with businesses, with
international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups, known as
nongovernmental organizations” (1997:50).
In such conditions, a  new institutionalist argument might argue that the form
new parties take will be the result of adoption of legitimate organizational forms in the
international arena (Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez, 1997).  Among the prominent
actors in the international arena, international non-governmental organizations play a
particular role in the support for particular groups (Boli and Thomas, 1997; Clark,
Freidman and Hochstetler, 1998; Pridham, 1996).  Although attention to transnational
organizations is not without precedent (Huntington, 1973; Keohane and Nye, 1972),
many have argued that international factors played a more influential role in the
democratic transformations in Eastern Europe than in the preceding southern European
and Latin American transformations (Pr dham, 1995).  For example, Schmitter argues,
“the international context surrounding democratization has shifted from a primary
reliance on public, inter-governmental channels of influence towards an increased
involvement of private, non-governmental organizations -- and it is the concrete
activity of these agents of consent, rather than the abstract process of contagion, that
accounts for the global reach of regime change and the fact that so few regressions to
autocracy have occurred” (1996:39)
Drawing on theories of institutional diffusion and mobilization, I argue that the
relationship between new political parties and transnational party organizations will
adopted which lack historical precedent but adapted to mobilize public support.  This
entails the simultaneous creation of interfaces with international organizations and local
one stage simultaneously.  Robert Putnam’s “two-level game” argues:
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the
politicans seek power by
constructing coalitions among those groups.  At the international level, national
while minimizing the adverse consquences of foreign developments. (1993:436)
logics of interaction by which international actors
can influence nation states – contagion, control and consent – to which 
(1996) adds, 
By focusing on the dual relationship, I seek to specify the conditions under
which new political parties will adopt certain models of Western party organization and
the emphasis on consensual knowledge in recent writings on “epistemic communities”
Sikkink, 1993), this approach allows
for conflicting models and principles, examining conflicts between international models
Risse-Kappen asks, “under what domestic and
international circumstances do transnational coalitions and actors who attempt to
(1995:5)  Thus, this paper does not assume that international assistance will necessarily
Carothers, 1996;
Robinson, 1996); rather it analyzes the variable impact of international actors in light
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The emphasis on the dual relationship between transnational party
organizations and new political parties highlights the ambiguity of the concept of
“democracy” in the post-Cold war world.  To international organizations, parties may
speak of one vision of democracy (a formal one in which institutions are replicated in
different contexts) while they simultaneously deploy a different vision for their
domestic audiences (a substantive one in which the challenges of the communist legacy
figure prominently).  These different visions do not necessarily undercut each other.
Indeed, ambiguity may be a virtue, enabling domestic actors to appear to respond both
to international and local concerns while avoiding policy commitments to either.
IV. The emergence of new political parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia:
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to account for the intricacies of party
development and the division of the country,2 I develop the claims in this paper by
analyzing the process by which new political parties emerged out of revolutionary
movements in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in light of international assistance.  To
provide a basis for comparison, I focus on the National Endowment for Democracy
and two of its beneficiaries which specifically target political parties, the National
Democratic Institute and the International Republic Institute (as representatives of the
U.S. approach to international party assistance).  Although not the only international
actors active in this period, assistance from the NED targeted for democratic
institutions and election assistance in Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic, and
Slovakia between 1989-1994 can be calculated to be approximately 40% of all
similarly-targeted foundation assistance.3  Below, I analyze each country separately.
                                         
2 For detailed accounts of party development and the break up of Czechoslovakia, see Blahoz 1994
Butorova 1993, Draper 1993, Innes, 1997, and Wightman 1991.
3 $1,088,000 out of $2,717,000 in Quigley 1997:142-5, 150-151.  Appendix 1 details NED grants
concerning political parties and elections in Czechoslovakia from 1990-92.
15
The Czech Republic
After the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia in 1989, a “government of
national understanding” (composed of all political forces) was formed not by new
political parties but by broad-based civic movements claiming to speak for “society.”
In the Czech Republic (which made up two-thirds of the population of the federation),
this movement called itself Civic Forum and was embodied in the former-dissident,
Vaclav Havel, who served as president of the federation.  The National Endowment for
Democracy provided nine grants intended to assist Civic Forum in the 1990 elections,
totaling $842,485 (although some of the grants were broadly intended for the
federation as a whole).  NED’s assistance can be categorized as general election
assistance (advising the drafting of a new election law and sending an international
observation team), equipment provision (such as fax machines and computers), and
party training (including seminars on party organization, civic education and voter
participation).
In the June, 1990 elections, twenty-three parties and movements competed (all
but five of whom were new organizations).  Civic Forum won 53% of the vote, with
the Communist Party coming in a surprising second, winning 13%.  Attention to
international assistance to Civic Forum in the 1990 elections reveals a broadly positive
portrait, although not one in which international actors may claim to have “caused”
democracy.  Rather, at best, they might claim to have supported the “democrats.”  The
project to assist the writing of the election law led to a threshold whereby parties had
to receive at least 5% of the popular vote to enter parliament.  This threshold enabled
Czechoslovakia to avoid the later political fragmentation in Poland which was
encouraged by a 3% threshold.  Since Civic Forum received seats proportional to the
votes received only by parties or movements which reached the threshold, they were
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able to consolidate a firm majority in both houses of parliament.  Second,
infrastructural assistance provided by the Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe in
1990 sought to meet immediate needs for administrative assistance in governing and
running election campaigns at a time when the new civic movements had virtually no
preexisting resources, financial or organizational.  At this time, the Czech crown
remained unconvertible, limiting economic purchasing power for modern equipment
from abroad.  Similarly, the assistance to Freedom House which provided newsprint to
Lidove Noviny must be placed in historical context as an underground dissident
newspaper that was transformed into the sole alternative to the Communist and
satellite party-controlled newspapers after the revolution, initially serving as Civic
Forum's voice in the media.  Both the civic movements and Lidove Novinyoperated in
this early period largely as they had in the revolutionary moments, overwhelmed by the
tasks facing them in light of the resources they had at their disposal.  It is not possible
to quantify the impact of such infrastructural assistance at this time when stable
budgets were still being created, but the ability of INGOs to act quickly and provide
resources to meet short term ne ds can be extremely valuable.  One can not be sure of
the counter-factual consequences of the absence of such provisions (whether the
movements would have faltered or other actors may have met these same needs), but it
is clear that such a need existed and that INGOs sought to provide assistance unlikely
to have been provided efficiently otherwise.
In this period NDI and IRI conducted “skills based” training workshops which
typically present the model on which political parties operate in the United States,
emphasizing the creation of new political organizations (including ties to local media,
the office of a political organization, and voting districts), the tasks of a political party
during an election campaign (such as door-to-door or mail order campaigning), and
fund raising.  Initially few, if any, of the members of Civic Forum were experienced in
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running elections and careful organization would be necessary.  In addition to the
assistance to the civic movements, IRI reported that its workshops were attended by
150 individuals representing 24 political parties, including some not part of the
umbrella coalitions.
Civic Forum, however, did not simply adopt a Western style campaign but
adapted it to reinvoke the spirit of the revolution in 1989.  Despite Hav l's d claration
that it was a temporary organization, Civic Forum maintained its identity as a civic
movement representing "society" in the 1990 elections.  Civic Forum's election slogan
was explicitly anti-party, declaring:  "Parties belong to Party Members:  Civic Forum
Belongs to All."  DeCandole argued that this primarily reflected the beliefs of the
dissident-turned-politicians, drawing on "the rejection of partisanship [that] formed the
philosophical core of Charter 77." (1991:20)  The consequences of the maintenance of
this identity included the refusal by Civic Forum to create membership procedures or
hierarchical organization during the 1990 elections.  Its membership principles declared
that:
Civic Forum is a movement of all citizens who agree with its programmatic
principles from 11.26.1989 and actively support their fulfillment, and of those
citizens who are not and do not want to be members of any political
party....Membership of united citizens in Civic Forum is informal.  They are not
joined by individual membership, membership cards or by paying membership
contributions.4
Civic Forum sought to demonstrate its ability to run as a credible opposition to the
Communist Party and proponent of economic reform.  Their platform was represented
by the broad slogan, "return to Europe," with the democratic system, market economy,
and cultural values which this implied.  At the same time, Civic Forum sought to avoid
a traditional appeal for votes.  As Miriam Horn observed, "For too long politics had
been paternalistic and pedantic, wagging its finger at the children of the state.  Now the
                                         
4 Koordinacni Centrum OF Praha [Coordination Center of Civic Forum Prague], 1990:72.
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imperative voice would be jettisoned.  It would not be 'Vote for Us,' but only, 'Civic
Forum, A chance for the future.'" (1990:12) The "merrin ss" which characterized Civic
Forum in the fall of communism was evident in its electoral style, marked by irony and
deliberate anti-politics.  On May first, traditionally a socialist holiday, "Campaign
workers donned huge paper mache heads, with scowling, puffy faces marking them as
members of the old regime, and mugged and pranced on the backs of trucks winding
through the streets." (Horn, 1990:11)
After the 1990 elections, the successor parties to Civic Forum adopted, as well
as adapted, Western forms of party organization in different ways, taking different
positions on key electoral issues.  The debate over the future of Civic Forum
crystallized around competition for chairmanship of Civic Forum between the former-
dissidents led by Martin Palous and new political figures led by Vaclav Klaus,
culminating with Klaus' election as chairman in October 1990.  On the one hand,
Palous argued that Civic Forum should continue to be governed during the transition
period by the "consensus-oriented politics" that were the legacy of Charter 77.5
Similarly, Jiri Dienstbier, the foreign minister and former-spokesman for Charter 77,
argued that Klaus' attempts to introduce hierarchical qualities into Civic Forum were
unnecessary and "inhumane." (in DeCa dole, 1991:21)  On the other hand, finance
minister Klaus argued that the non-hierarchical nature of Civic Forum had begun to
impede its ability to implement political and economic reform.  Contrary to Civic
Forum's electoral program in the 1990 elections, Klaus declared the need to create
formal membership structures which would enable the building of an effective party
and link the regions in hierarchical party structures for effective coordination. Over
differences between these two groupings on the appropriate form of the movement,
Civic Forum dissolved itself in February, 1991 into the Civic Democratic Party
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(Obcanska Demokraticka Strana, or ODS) led by Finance Minister Klaus and Civic
Movement (Obcanske Hnuti, or OH), led by Foreign Minister Dienstbier.
In its founding program, ODS argued that the many of the most serious
problems facing Czechoslovakia had "arisen due to the hesitant policies pursued by
Civic Forum throughout 1990.  Little action was taken against many surviving
totalitarian structures.  The Civic Democratic Party finds it intolerable that many
important posts are still held by communists."6  In December, 1990 as chairman of
Civic Forum, Klaus had declared his constituency to be young people, Christians, and
entrepreneurs, and not artists and intellectuals among whom "trends toward lef ism
originate." (Quoted in DeCandole, 1991:22.)  Strikingly, such a constituency did not
reflect pre-existing social cleavages, nor even a clearly defined social group.  At that
time entrepreneurs, when privatization of formerly-state owned companies had not yet
taken place, can hardly have been said to exist as a social group with concrete
interests.  Rather ODS’ constituency was defined in political terms that sought to
marginalize the former-dissidents that had created and led Civic Forum during the
revolution.
Consistent with its claims that the greatest problems facing the country
concerned its relationship to the past, ODS supported the screening (or “lustration”)
law which banned former-communist functionaries and secret police collaborators from
elected or appointed public or professional positions in state organizations and joint-
stock companies in which the state held a majority interest (Welsh, 1996). Although
the law was condemned by the European Union as unconstitutional, the Civic
Democratic Party incorporated the same principles into its founding statues which
declared, "I am not a member of any political party and I have never been a member of
                                                                                                              
5 Interview with the author, 4/19/94.
6 In East European Reporter, 1991:48.
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the People's Militia, StB [secret police], nor a collaborator for them."  The eventual
law on lustration, passed in October, 1991, was led by and publicly supported by
parliamentarians from ODS.  Anti-left discourse was repeated by Klaus throughout the
1992 election campaign, when he described OH as a "left wing party, using the term
'liberal' in the American sense, not in the European sense, to my regret." (1992:22)  In
a claim which would be repeated in the 1992 elections, ODS linked its support for its
market reforms with support for democracy and the federal state.  Rather than
unequivocal support for Czechoslovakia, the party's program declared that the party
"wishes to retain the existing Czechoslovak Federation, if the federal state proves to be
viable and does not hinder further social change.  However, there must be unified
defence [sic] and foreign policies and financial and tax policies throughout the whole
country."7  This program was accompanied by the implementation of the institutional
structures of the party across the country identified in Klaus' earlier proposals for Civic
Forum.  This network would provide it with an organized network with which to
conduct the 1992 electoral campaign.  With this network, it also raised greater income
(with 43 million crowns in 1991) than the Civic Movement (with 18 million crowns)
(Mlynar, 1992).
By contrast, OH declared its alliance to the principles of Civic Forum as set out
in its original 1989 founding document and its intention to fulfill the 1990 election
program "which has not as yet been implemented."8  Consistent with its origins, it
sought to maintain the unity of society.  In contrast to ODS's identification of its
supporters as a specific set of potential voters, the OH program called for "dialogue
and cooperation with the democratic right and the democratic left."  It argued for a
"radical but not ruthless" reform of the economy and held the lustration law to be
                                         
7 In East European Reporter, 1991:49.
8 In East European Reporter, 1991:49.
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unacceptable from an ethical and legal standpoint.  OH’s most prominent leader,
Foreign Minister Ji i Dienstbier, repeated criticized the law and, in an ironic twist of
fate, voted with the communist party to oppose it in parliament.  In contrast to ODS's
conditional support for the federation as long as it could be "viable," OH argued there
should be even greater autonomy for ethnic groups:  "We believe that the
Czechoslovak Federation should be retained.  But the new constitution must make it
possible for Moravia and Silesia to also enjoy autonomy; whether as self-contained
lands within the Czech republic, or as member of a tripa titite federation of Bohemia,
Moravia, and Slovakia."9  In the postcommunist context, OH's similar call for united
economic and foreign policies appeared strained at best.
After the successful 1990 elections, international assistance to Civic Forum’s
successors dropped off dramatically.  The NED provided several grants in this period
broadly targeted to the federation as a whole.  It granted NDI $74,000 to organize
party-building workshops on improving party organizations and on the mechanisms of
grassroots organization and communications, and it awarded IRI $57,000 to sponsor a
series of four training seminars in Czechoslovakia and Hungary to encourage the
informed participation of women and youth in the political process.  It granted the
Association for Independent Social Analysis $19,300 to enable this Prague-based
association to conduct a survey in advance of the June, 1992 elections on Czech and
Slovak attitudes toward political parties, participation in the electoral process,
democratically-elected government, and economic and social reform.   Further, with
funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development, NDI provided assistance
aimed at longer-term political party development in 1991 and 1992 to six parties in
each of the Czech and Slovak Republics.  Regrettably, the available data does not
                                         
9 In East European Reporter, 1991:50.
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indicate precisely which six parties in each republic NDI worked with, nor what the
nature of their programs were.
As noted, in the 1992 elections the Civic Democratic Party garnered the largest
percentage of the vote, while the Civic Movement failed to reach the electoral
threshold to enter parliament. After Klaus’s victory in the elections President Hav l
called upon him and Vladimir Meciar as the leaders of the majority parties to form a
government, but both party leaders quickly decided it was impossible without
agreement on the nature of the Czechoslovak state.  Klaus declared that "today's
maimed federation was not capable of guaranteeing a continuation of economic
reform" (Zak, 1995:262).   With this, both leaders prepared to divide the state, even as
pre-election public opinion polls in 1992 showed that an independent state was
supported by less than one-third of the population in Slovakia and even less in the
Czech Republic (Butora and Butorova, 1993:721).
Slovakia
In Slovakia, the emergence of political parties took a different direction from
the Czech Republic and proved to have negative consequences for democracy.  After
1989 current and former-communists retained greater influence than in the Czech
Republic.  The Slovak communists were not compromised by the repression of the
student demonstration in Prague in November 1989, nor were they as repressive in
general as their Czech counterparts.  The Slovak opposition that formed Public
Against Violence was also not as large, nor prepared to create a new government.
Indeed, Public Against Violence’s highest representatives in the federal government
were recent or former-communists (prime minister Calfa and speaker of Parliament
Dubcek), as well as in the Slovak government (prime minister Cic).  Unlike Civic
Forum, which maintained its broad identity until the elections, Public Against Violence
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(Verejnost’ Proti Nasili or VPN) divided almost immediately when its main
representative at the round table negotiations broke off to form the Christian
Democratic Movement (Krest’anske Democraticke Hnutia, or KDH).  In the June
1990 elections, when faced with its weakness in public opinion polls, the movement’s
leaders deliberately chose to include the popular former-communist politicians and saw
a corresponding rise in its political fortunes (Antalova, 1998).
Again by contrast to the Czech Republic, international assista ce to Slovakia
was a fraction of the sum provided to the federation as a whole, although Public
Against Violence can be said to have benefited from the grants by NED to draft a new
election law and to monitor the elections.  This suggests the need for international
assistance to pay greater sensitivity to ethnic differences within federal states, although
it should be emphasized that these were national elections and the capital of the
country at that time was Prague.  The only grant targeted to assist Public Against
Violence was a $180,000 grant from IDEE which provided equipment and operational
assistance that enabled Public Against Violence to equip four regional offices, partly
fund its newspaper V ejnost, and support the Center for Research for Social Problems
which conducted public opinion surveys and sociological studies.
Like Civic Forum in the Czech Republic, Public Against Violence did not
simply adopt Western models of election campaigns in the 1990 elections but sought to
recreate the “merry” spirit of the revolution.  Rather than run as a political party,
Public Against Violence's program, titled "A chance for Slovakia," declared that this
was "a chance for all."  Its declared aim was "to guarantee that the democratic changes
which have begun will continue and not be turned back."10  The Public Against
Violence headquarters in Bratislava prepared a show of caricature and parody of the
                                         
10 "Sanca pre Slovensko (program hnutia Verejnost' proti nasilu) [A chance for Slovkaia (The
program of the movement Public Against Violence)]," x rox.
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symbols of communist rule, including "shrouded busts of Lenin and torn Communist
Party flags spread across the floor for the visitors to walk on."  As Horn observed,
"Having long endured politics imposed from above, full of insufferably wooden
rhetoric, elaborate ceremony, and self-important men in cheap suits and slicked-back
hair, they decided the only antidote was to make this campaign into a carnival."
(1990:11)  Notably however, while Civic Forum won the majority of the vote in the
Czech Republic, Public Against Violence won only roughly 35% of the vote in
Slovakia (averaging its support in both houses), with the newly formed Christian
Democratic Movement winning roughly 17% and the ex-communists winning 13%.
After the 1990 elections, Public Against Violence splintered again surrounding
a leadership struggle for the movement, although the formation of new parties took a
less democratic route than in the Czech Republic.  After Slovak prime minister
Vladimir Meciar failed to win the chairmanship of the movement in February, 1991 his
close associate, the Slovak Foreign Minister appeared on television and declared that
the leadership of VPN had attempted to censor Me iar's weekly television speech (a
claim later disavowed).  Based on the popular perception that he was a victim of
communist-style politics, Meciar's popularity soared.  Subsequently the Presidium of
the Slovak National Council (controlled by the VPN leadership) called for Meci r's
resignation leading him to form the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Hnuti za
Demokraticke Slovensko, r HZDS), while the remainder of Public Against Violence
merged itself into the Civic Democratic Union (Obcanske Democraticke Union, r
ODU).  In April, 1991 Meciar was officially replaced as prime minister not by a
representative of the weakened ODU but by the leader of the Christian-Democratic
Party, Jan Carnogursky.  Opinion polls at that time indicate that although ODU and
KDH continued to control the cabinet, HZDS polled support from about 27% of the
electorate.  With the support of the parties on the left (such as the former-Slovak
25
Communist party) Meciar's party could count on over 50% of the electorate, while
ODU and KDH together could only count on about 30%. (Wheaton and Kavan,
1992:233f)
Just as Vaclav Klaus in the Czech Republic sought to link the issue of the
federation to acceptance of his economic reforms, new political parties in Slovakia also
tied the relations between the republics to claims about the proper speed or direction of
economic reform.  Because heavy industry dating from the communist period was
located primarily in Slovakia, many argued that market reform had to take a different
path than in the Czech Republic.  Further, the emphasis in the Czech Republic on the
"lustration" of all officials who had been communist party members was perceived as a
threat in Slovakia, where many prominent ex-communists (including Meciar and the
speaker of the federal parliament, Alexander Dubcek) remained active in politics.
The question of the proper relationship between the republics was unclear
during the election campaign of most Slovak parties, creating uncertainty as to the
consequences of electoral victory for one party or another.  Meciar's HZDS took an
ambiguous stand, emphasizing Slovak “sovereignty” and “autonomy” but without
specifying his intentions for the future of the republic. This enabled him to “take
sovereignty onto his agenda but in such a way that left Slovakia’s potential legal status
completely ambiguous.” (Innes, 1997: 420)  Draper refers to Meciar’s advocacy of
"confederation" as "a code word for loosening the bonds without breaking them."
(1993:22)  While Slovak prime minister Carnogursky from the Christian Democratic
Movement declared his support for the federation, he at the same time identified his
goal as "a star for Slovakia in the European flag." (Carno ursky, 1992)  That is,
Slovakia would remain part of the Czech and Slovak federation until entry into the
European Union when each republic would enter as sovereign nations.  Only the
marginal Slovak National Party, which received low support in public opinion polls,
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called outright for an independent state, while the successor to Public Against
Violence, ODU, declared in its founding program, "We f vour [sic] the maintenance of
a stable, democratic Czech and Slovak Federative Republic based on equal rights for
all citizens and nationalities."11  Although positive toward the federation, this statement
avoided answering the constitutional question about how relations would be
institutionalized.
International assistance to new political parties in Slovakia after the 1990
elections was nearly non-existent.  According to Quigley (1997), none of the
international actors studied in this report had offices in Slovakia until after the breakup
in 1993.  As noted, the NED provided several grants in this period broadly targeted to
the federation as a whole, including assistance aimed at longer-term political party
development in 1991 and 1992 to six parties in each of the Czech and Slovak
Republics (although the available data does not indicate precisely which six parties in
each republic participated).
In the 1992 elections Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia received
the largest percentage of the vote, followed by the ex-communists and Slovak
Nationalists (with the Christian Democratic Movement fourth and the Civic
Democratic Union failing to reach the electoral threshold).  Meciar quickly announced
he had a mandate that included the independence of Slovakia, a Slovak constitution,
and international recognition of a sovereign Slovakia and agreed with Vaclav Klaus to
divide the country.  While the absence of international assistance can not be said to
have caused Meciar’s success, the contrast with the victory of the democratic market
reformers in the Czech Republic is striking.  The failure of the Public Against
Violence’s heir, the Civic Democratic Union, suggests that Western models of party
organization do not take hold automatically across political and historical contexts, nor
                                         
11 In East European Reporter, January-February 1992:66.
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does initial success in founding elections guarantee the continued success of
democratic parties.  It highlights the danger of splintering the democratic opposition,
rendering them vulnerable to populist challengers.
Further, Meciar's electoral success can not be explained in terms of the
resonance of Slovak nationalist claims nor the values of the electorate.  After the
election public opinion polls indicated that the largest percentage of a survey of Slovak
voters, 36.6%, indicated only negative feelings about the split of the country
(compared to 26.7% who felt only positive and 21.8% who felt ambivalent).
(Butorova, 1993:70)  Research on HZDS voters reveals a range of opinions about the
proper role of the federation:  14% believed that Slovakia should be part of a unitary
Czechoslovak state, 29% favored federation, 22% favored confederation, and 19% an
independent Slovak state. (Fric, 1992:79)  As Martin Butora and Zora Butorova
observed, "what proved to be crucial was not the public opinion but the lack of
sufficiently strong political groupings on both sides that could have shared their basic
ideas and concepts about the form of the common state and could have cooperated in a
systematic and efficient way in the preservation and development of this shared vision."
(Butora and Butorova, 1993:721)
IV.  Analysis and conclusions
 In this paper I made two criticisms of the traditional approach to political party
formation:  that new parties in po tcommunist East Central Europe will not necessarily
follow the paths of previous democracies in representing preexisting social cleavages,
and that this approach ignores the impact of international actors.  Let me return to both
claims.  First, rather than emerging on the basis of preexisting social and economic
cleavages as they have in earlier democracies, I have argued that the new parties in the
Czech Republic and Slovakia emerged as part of a process of competition and
Glenn, page 28
28
mobilization for electoral support. Although all political forces after the fall of
communism had to confront organizational imperatives that echo Michels’ warnings
about oligarchy, the traditional process of parties emerging on the basis of preexisting
social cleavages is difficult to apply to these conditions.  For example, although
Czechoslovakia was the only country in East Central Europe that could claim a
democratic legacy predating communism, the new parties did not reflect prior
historical cleavages and the previously dominant social democratic parties of the First
Czechoslovak Republic did not re-emerge as powerful political forces12; rather, a new
rightist Civic Democratic Party led by Finance Minister Klaus emerged in the Czech
Republic to govern successfully.
As I have argued, in the dynamic conditions of postcommunist reform, political
identities and economic interests are in greater flux than in stable periods, parties using
similar symbols to identify themselves may have very different aims, and policy
programs may be broadly similar in their support for political and economic
liberalization.  While Civic Forum and Public Against Violence initially represented the
pro-democratic forces in Czechoslovakia after 1989, they were not political parties in
the traditional sense of the word.  Under such conditions, as the literature on
contentious politics suggests, leaders of new political parties are likely to act like social
movement entrepreneurs seeking to mobilize potential supporters in light of varying
opportunities, resources and ways of framing their claims (McAdam, McCarthy and
Zald, 1996).  Notably, rather than reflecting public sentiments to divide the country,
the dominant successor parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia sought to mobilize
votes in the absence of public support for separation by linking their claims for
economic reform with the appropriate relationship between republics.
                                         
12 See Rothschild (1974) for electoral data on inter-war parties in Czechoslovakia.
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Thus, contrary to the notion that new parties in Czechoslovakia reflected
preexisting regional, religious and ethnic cleavages (Wightman, 1991), the new parties
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia successfully mobilized electoral support on the
basis of political cleavages by blurring key issues related to the transformation process.
As deputy chairman of the Czech National Council in 1992 observed:
Czech politicians avoid getting into disputes with Slovak politicians because they
don’t want to confront Slovak nationalism, which is on the rise.  This…has allowed
Slovak politicians to avoid taking a clear position on important issues such as the
structure of Czechoslovakia.  For example, the KDH proclaims that it supports a
common state, yet it lays down conditions that would make such a state impossible.
(Kalvoda, 1992:71)
This is not to minimize the very real economic differences in each republic due to
different experiences of industrialization under communism.  Rather it is to argue that
the polarization of the new political parties was not the result of ancient ethnic
differences nor economic forces but the political result of leaders of new parties
competing for electoral support in uncertain conditions.  The electoral success by ODS
and HZDS suggests the linking of each party's views on economic reform, the
lustration law, and the relationship between republics, as well as their organizational
advantages in the election campaign.
Second, the divergent paths taken by the two countries highlight the limits to
applying Western models of party organization across contexts and the need for
democratic actors to be strengthened beyond founding elections.  All claims of
influence must be measured in light of dynamic, contingent developments, especially
when the amounts of funding are relatively small and their activities or efforts rarely
create binding arrangements (in contrast to international monetary institutions which
can enforce economic sanctions or governmental organizations which can enforce
political sanctions).  On first glance, the amount spent and projects described in the
cases above may seem an relatively small to have had any meaningful impact.  In
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absolute terms, it is difficult to say whether the NED achieved its aims of fostering
democracy, regardless of whether the Czech Republic and Slovakia became more
democratic during the time in question.  On the one hand, virtually all of these
activities could be said to contribute towards making things more democratic; on the
other, it's difficult to claim that the observed impact was really caused by the actions of
the international actors themselves.  Rather, the cases highlight the dual relationship,
whereby international models of party organization and election campaigning are
adopted in some cases but adapted to mobilize popular support.
Any assessment of transnational assistance to political parties in the 1990
elections must begin with the observation that Civic Forum and Public Against
Violence were pro-democratic in their origins, certainly prior to international
assistance.  They were not, however, political parties in the traditional sense of the
word.  Initially revolutionary movements are unlikely to have a strong party
identification and may seek assistance from all sources, given their perceived need for
help, while international pressures may lead other parties or movements to reject
assistance from seemingly appropriate partners.  For example, Vaclav Klaus’ Civic
Democratic Party, despite his Thatcherite rhetoric, chose to establish links with the
German Christian Democrats rather than British conservatives, whose stance against
European integration might have hindered entry to the EU (Pridham, 1996:209).
Analysis of transnational assistance in the Czech Republic and Slovakia
demonstrates that such efforts play a more significant role in the early period as
revolutionary movements face the initial problems of governing than in the subsequent
period of competition among new parties.  NED’s earlier observation that it could
prepare an election advising team for President Havel within a week suggests that
international non-governmental organizations can provide assistance more quickly than
most government bureaucracies (Quigley, 1997).  Assistance at such times can have
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disproportionately large consequences since the institutional arrangements created in
this period can structure the medium-term allocation of resources among political
contenders.  Pridham observes, “external support may be an important moral or
material resource for party strategies, particularly at this time when new party systems
are being constructed” (1995:27-28).
The development of new political parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia
reveals the limitations of democracy assistance targeted solely towards free elections.
International assistance after the 1990 elections declined dramatically, and the nature
of funding for political parties changed as well, with the state itself becoming a major
source of funds, reimbursing parties for election expenses and providing salaries for
elected members (Lewis, 1998).  According to Nadia Diuk, Senior Program Office at
NED at the time, NED’s assistance to political parties was limited by two primary
factors:  the domestic politics of financing assistance to Eastern Europe and the
evolving understanding of assistance to promote democracy.13  First, the dramatic
decline in funding between 1990 and 1992 as the result of changes in U.S. policy
concerning assistance to Eastern Europe.  While NED was asked to administer the first
year of SEED funding in 1990 (because of AID’s inexperience with democracy
assistance and with the region), it subsequently lost this funding when Congressional
policy reallocated control to AID. After 1990, NED had to rely upon its own
appropriation and its partners, NDI and IRI, upon their regular allocation of funds
from them, which were significantly smaller.  Although NDI and IRI began to apply for
funding directly from AID, the process was lengthier and slower than NED funding,
which may explain the time gap between the diverse projects in 1990 and
comparatively little funding in 1992.
                                         
13 Interview with author, 3/23/1999.
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Second, many policy makers in Washington had little prior experience with
assistance to new political parties, having worked previously only with development
aid.  They therefore initially believed that democracy assistance was largely complete
once founding elections had been held and the “democrats” were in power.  While
NED had a history of work in the region, the 1990-92 period was one in which fund rs
and policy makers were also learning about the need for ongoing assistance to prevent
reversals in democratization.  Meciar’s rise to prominence in Slovakia in 1991
highlights the need for assistance to parties to continue beyond founding elections as
revolutionary movements become new political parties.
By stressing how new party leaders adapt Western models to mobilize electoral
support, I have sought to avoid making leaders of new parties seem either overly
cynical or like “dupes”(summed up in Vaclav Klaus’s rejection of international
assistance as “soft advice for hard currency”).  Transnational links between parties of
similar ideological tendencies have a long post-war history, beginning with the German
stiftungen (Pinto-Duschinsky, 1991, 1997; Pridham, 1996).  The failure of the dissident
led successors to the revolutionary movements is notable, in light of their failure to
adopt Western models of party organization.  Consistent with Michels’ arguments
about the need for organizational hierarchy in modern political parties, Vacl v Klaus
declared that the success of his Civic Democratic Party in the Czech Republic:
was the final blow to those who advocated the ideas of ‘unpolitical politics,’ to
those who saw the future as a world full of civic movements and temporary
initiatives without party structures or clearly defined organizational rules, to those
who wanted a world based on brave and innovative ideas implemented directly by
enlightened intellectuals who tried to stay above the complicated world of politics.
(Klaus, 1997:110)
If the Czech Republic and Slovakia are suggestive, the “anti-politics” of dissidents and
revolutionary movements is virtually powerless against the imperatives of
contemporary political competition.  Yet Paul Hirst lso argues that the revolutionary
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homogeneous political 
which relies on the divisions
contained within the party system to ensure social and political order." (1991:234,
italics in original)  As I have argued, this process is not straightforward, especially
nearly one quarter of the vote in each republic was for parties which failed to reach the
electoral threshold and enter parliament.
efforts of NED, NDI and IRI in the context of other international efforts in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia.  In addition to the NED, Quigley identifies eight other
“election assistance” including the Ford Foundation (the largest donor), the Charta 77
Mellon Foundation, the Bradley foundation, the Westminister
German political party foundations whose assistance he was unable to disaggregate
stiftungen, in German)
provide a comparative point of reference to evaluate the impact of NED, NDI and IRI.
parties themselves, members of political parties may participate in their projects aimed
at political education, which may include trips by party members to attend seminars in
democratizing countries.  Michael Dauderstadt of the Ebert Foundation
observes that fifty percent of all monies is devoted towards the maintenance of the
expenditures of the Freidrich 
Glenn, page 34
34
spent on measures directly for parties in Central and Eastern Europe and the former-
Soviet Union (personal communication, 1998).  Without systematic research, evidence
of the influence of the German stiftungen can only be speculative, but as one official
observed, “We back several horses in the race; whichever is the victor, Germany wins”
(quoted in Pinto-Duschinsky, 1997:298).
The focus on parties and elections in this paper emphasizes the emergence of
“constitutional democracies” not political democracies which rest upon principles of
liberalism (in the language of Freedom House).  After the separation of the country in
1993, however, the Czech Republic and Slovakia took markedly different paths.  The
Czech Republic became seen as a model of democratic development, securing early
membership in NATO and the European Union, while Slovakia continued its
questionable commitment to democracy and failed to be admitted to either NATO or
the EU.  Only with the 1998 elections in Slovakia did Meci r lose power to a newly
formed Slovak Democratic Coalition which sought to remedy Slovakia’s poor
international performance and image.
Further comparative research would elaborate the claims in this paper by
specifying the influence of particular types of organizations and of particular legacies
of communist states.  Such research should examine the influence of the European
Union’s PHARE program upon new democracies (Pinder, 1994) as well as compare
Czechoslovakia with other postcommunist countries, such as Poland (where party
fragmentation hobbled postcommunist governments) or Hungary (where parties had
emerged prior to the round table negotiations).  Comparison with assistance to political
parties in the former-Soviet Union or new parties in South Africa might provide
contrasting paths of democratization (Kl ndermans, Roefs, and Olivier, 1998).
Analysis of assistance to the former-Yugoslavia might highlight the risks of assistance
in conditions of war.   Further, the particularities of assistance in the immediate period
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after the fall of communism might be contrasted to subsequent developments as
assistance should be different, and attention to evolution over time should provide
insight into the consequences of particular forms of assistance in the early period for
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Appendix 1. NED grants concerning political parties and elections in
Czechoslovakia, 1990-92
(1) NDI in 1990 with $11,079 to convene an international group of experts to advise
the new Czech and Slovak leadership in the drafting of a new election law.
(2) Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE) with $290,000 “to enable Civic
Forum to educate and involve the public in the political process in preparation for
national elections in 1990.”
(3) Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE) in 1990 with $81,000 to
provide “infrastructural support” to Civic Forum.
(4) Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe in 1990 (IDEE) with $180,000 to
provide “organizational and publishing support” for Public Against Violence.
(5) NDI in 1990 with $53,792 to “organize a multip rtisan training seminar for Czech
and Slovak party leaders on the methods of democratic party organization, civic
education, and campaign techniques.”
(6)  NDI in 1990 with $172,512 to “conduct national and regional training workshops
on voter education and participation, provide advice on election laws and regulations
and support a public opinion survey.”
(7)  IRI in 1990 with $42,060 to “conduct national and regional training workshops on
the electoral process and provide limited infrastructural support to a range of political
parties.”
(8) IRI in 1990 with $32,042 to coordinate an international observation delegation to
monitor the national elections in Czechoslovakia.
(9) Freedom House in 1990 with $140,000 to provide newsprint for the newspaper
Lidove Noviny, allowing the paper to continue printing during the period leading up to
the national elections in 1990.
(10) Freedom House with $20,000 to help “Lidove Noviny, the Republic’s premier
independent daily newspaper, reach its circulation goal of 500,000 in 1990.
(11) IRI $57,000 in 1991 to sponsor a series of four training seminars in
Czechoslovakia and Hungary to encourage the informed participation of women and
youth in the political process.
(12) NDI $74,000 in 1992 to organize party-building workshops on improving party
organizations and on the mechanisms of grassroots organization and communications.
(13)  the Association for Independent Social Analysis in 1992 $19,300 to enable this
Prague-based association to conduct a survey in advance of the June, 1992 elections
on Czech and Slovak attitudes toward political parties, participation in the electoral
process, democratically-elected government, and economic and social reform.
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Table 1.  1990 National election results in Czechoslovakia14
1.  Czech Republic
House of People House of Nations
Party % of the voteSeats won % of the voteSeats won
Civic Forum 53.15 68 49.96 50
Communist Party CS 13.48 15 13.80 12
Christian-Democratic Union  8.69 9   8.75 6
Moravian-Silesian Association  7.89 9   9.10 7
Parties below 5% threshold16.79 -- 18.39 --
2.  Slovakia
House of People House of Nations
Party % of the voteSeats won % of the voteSeats won
Public Against Violence 32.54 19 37.28 33
Christian Dem. Movement 18.98 11 16.66 14
Communist Party CS 13.81 8 13.43 12
Slovak National Party 10.96 6 11.44 9
Hungarian ethnic party   8.58 5   8.49 7
Parties below 5% threshold15.13 -- 12.70 --
                                         
14 Krejci, 1995:340-341.
Glenn, page 42
42
Table 2.  1992 National election results in Czechoslovakia15
Czech Republic:
Federal Assembly Czech Parliament
Party % of the voteSeats won % of the voteSeats won
Civic Democratic Party 34 85 30 76
Left Bloc (Communists) 14 19 14 35
Social Democrats   8 16   6 16
Republican Party   6 14   6 14
Christian Democrats   6 13   6 15
Liberal Social Union   6 12   7 16
Civic Democratic Alliance   -- --   6 14
Moravia/Silesia Association   -- --   6 14
Parties below the threshold26 -- 19 --
Slovakia
Federal Assembly Slovak Parliament
Party % of the voteSeats won % of the voteSeats won
Mvmt for Dem. Slovakia 34 57 37 74
Democratic Left 14 23 15 29
Slovak Nationalists   9 15   8 15
Christian Democratic Mvmt.   9 14   9 18
Hungarian ethnic party   7 12   7 14
Slovak Soc. Dem.   6   5  -- --
Parties below the threshold21 -- 24 --
                                         
15 Olson, 1993:310.
